Showing posts with label Roman Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Roman Law. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 20, 2010

Roman Law and European Culture

Reinhard Zimmermann, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, has published Roman Law and European Culture (Derecho Romano y Cultura Europea), at Revista de Derecho Privado no. 18, 5-35 (2010). Here is the abstract.
The European legal tradition takes its distinctive feature of the ius commune, which is rooted primarily in Roman law. This paper aims to establish its relationship and analyze, within that context, the most influential features of the ancient Roman law. It also describes the transformations in the perception of Roman law and finally asks the following question: How Roman is the current Roman law? How European is the European legal "tradition?"

Download the article from SSRN at the link. It is in Spanish.

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

Roman Sumptuary Laws

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, and Centre for the Study of European Contract Law; Tinbergen Institute, and Anna E. Plisecka, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, have published Luxury in Ancient Rome: Scope, Timing and Enforcement of Sumptuary Laws as Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2010-03. Here is the abstract.
Between 182 BC and 18 BC, Roman lawmakers enacted a series of sumptuary laws regulating banquet expenditures. These regulations included a maximum for the number of guests and restrictions on specific foods; moreover, they were reiterated over time but were rarely enforced. Traditional explanations based on morals, protection of patrimonies and political competition do not fully account for the scope, timing and enforcement patterns of such laws. We advance and formalize a novel hypothesis, which is based on four elements: (1) luxury is a signal of wealth; (2) the senatorial class holding political power enacts sumptuary laws to restrict signaling when individuals coming from an emerging class (the equestrians) become wealthier than them; (3) enforcement of such laws would facilitate signaling of wealth and hence would be counterproductive; finally (4), the reiteration of these laws can be explained as an attempt to leverage on the expressive function of the law. The rise of sumptuary legislation occurred when the senatorial class lost economic power to the equestrians, its fall when they also lost political power to the princeps (and later the emperor). These points are discussed against the historical and legal background and presented formally.


Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Friday, October 30, 2009

An Economic Analysis of Immoral Contracts in Roman Law

Péter Cserne, Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), and Gergely Deli have published "Contracts and Morals: Towards an Economic Analysis of Immoral Contracts in Ancient Rome," as TILEC Discussion Paper 2009-037. Here is the abstract.

The way we nowadays think about “immoral” contracts is based on a number of assumptions. One of those assumptions concerns the relative isolation of law and extralegal standards. This view, however, is not new or even modern: to a large extent, it can be traced back to Roman law that has been both praised and condemned for this relative separation. In this paper we venture into the problematic of immoral transactions by combining historical, doctrinal and economic analysis. Focusing on cases and doctrines in ancient Roman law, our goal is to show how Roman lawyers found reasonable answers to issues which, in spite of obvious differences in economic and cultural context, can teach some lessons for modern contract law. After a brief preliminary on methodological problems of the economic analysis of legal history, we reconstruct the dynamics of how and why the term immorality (contra bones mores) became a general clause of Roman contract law in a relatively short time; discuss what kind of cases were solved with reference to this clause; and analyse how this clause shows the practical rationality of Roman lawyers. Finally we discuss some substantive and methodological insights this historical case can provide for the economic analysis of the interactions of law and morality.

Download the paper from SSRN here.