The Eden Narratives and Law

Geoffrey P. Miller, New York University School of Law, has published The Dark Age: How the Biblical Narratives Demonstrate the Necessity for Law and Government as NYU School of Law Public Law Research Paper No. 10-18. Here is the abstract.

In earlier work I argue that the Garden of Eden story in the book of Genesis explores a basic question for political theory: why people have an obligation to obey the law. The narratives that follow describe a “Dark Age” in world history characterized by accelerating violence and ending in a catastrophic flood. These texts expand the analysis of the Eden narratives by asking whether human beings can achieve a good life in the absence of government and law. The narratives describe an experiment in which people interact strategically with one another in an environment where cooperation can generate a surplus but defection from cooperative arrangements is always possible. The message of the Dark Age texts is that, at least under the specified conditions of scarcity, self-interest, and character types, people will not achieve a good life in the absence of government and law.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Abraham Lincoln as a Legal Writer

Judith D. Fischer, University of Louisville School of Law, has published Abraham Lincoln as a Legal Writer. Here is the abstract.

This article draws on a recent collection of Abraham Lincoln’s legal papers as well as on secondary sources to show how Lincoln developed his genius as a writer. The article then discusses characteristics that made his writing so eloquent. It concludes that today’s lawyers might profitably emulate Lincoln’s close study of great literature as well as his clear, succinct writing style.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

An Originalist Interpretation of the Ninth Amendment

Louis Michael Seidman, Georgetown University Law Center, has published "Our Unsettled Ninth Amendment: An Essay on Unenumerated Rights and the Impossibility of Textualism," as Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 10-11. Here is the abstract.

The Ninth Amendment - our resident anarchic and sarcastic "constitutional jester" - mocks the effort of scholars and judges alike to tame and normalize constitutional law. It is not as if the stern disciplinarians haven't tried. We now have two generations worth of painstaking, erudite, and occasionally brilliant scholarship that attempts to rein it in. Yet the amendment stubbornly resists control. It stands as a paradoxical, textual monument to the impossibility of textualism, an entrenched, settled instantiation of the inevitability of unsettlement. If it did not exist, constitutional skeptics would have had to invent it.

This essay has two parts. In Part I, I present a new and, I hope, persuasive, originalist account of the Ninth Amendment. My claim is that the Amendment deliberately leaves unsettled the status of unenumerated rights. Because of the Ninth Amendment, the Constitution does not "deny" or "disparage" these rights, but neither does it embrace or imply them. The amendment puts off to another day a final reckoning of the extent to which we are bound by constitutional text.

Although I use originalist methodology in Part I, I do not want to be understood as embracing originalism. Instead, this Part is an exercise in internal critique. As Part II explains, the Ninth Amendment states a truth that we would have to deal with whether or not it was part of the original text: No matter how comprehensive, no text can control the force of ideas and commitments that lie outside the text. This simple truth leaves the status of liberal constitutionalism permanently and inevitably unsettled. The day of final reckoning will never arrive.

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Legal Fictions

Nancy J. Knauer, Temple University School of Law, has published Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, in volume 22 of St. Thomas Law Review (2010). Here is the abstract.

The classic legal fiction is a curious artifice of legal reasoning. In a discipline primarily concerned with issues of fact and responsibility, the notion of a legal fiction should seem an anathema or, at the very least, an ill-suited means to promote a just result. However, the deployment of a patently false statement as a necessary component of a legal rule is a widely practiced and accepted mode of legal analysis. In rem forfeiture proceedings rest on the fiction that the inanimate object was bad. Attractive nuisance re-imagines the child trespasser as an invitee. A host of doctrines bearing the term "constructive" in their titles adopt an "as if" rationalization that deems something to have occurred despite the fact that it did not (e.g., constructive notice, constructive eviction, and constructive discharge).

Legal commentators writing in the diverse fields of law and literature, tax policy, and empirical legal studies have taken a renewed interest in legal fictions, including Fuller’s influential work from the 1930s. They have applied the label "legal fiction" to an eclectic group of legal rules, including slavery, the doctrine of discovery, the tax code, and empirically erroneous legal presumptions (i.e., discredited legal regimes, complex statutory schemes, and empirical legal errors). These newly identified legal fictions do not satisfy Fuller’s classic definition of a legal fiction because they are neither acknowledged to be false nor demonstrably false. The enduring conundrum presented by the classic legal fiction is that it retains its utility despite its falsity, similar to false statements used in science and mathematics in order to advance a proof or hypothesis.

Any discussion of fiction necessarily invokes a concept of reality against which the fiction can be measured. Thus, before we can speak intelligibly of fictions, we must first be able to identify truth. Does it make any sense to refer to slavery as a fiction when it was, in fact, a legal system that brutalized millions? Is the choice of a tax base "false" simply because it is statutorily prescribed? Certain legal rules, such as those governing eye witness testimony, explicitly incorporate statements of fact that are readily verifiable by reference to real world events. Slavery and the doctrine of discovery encompass abstract concepts, such as liberty, autonomy and sovereignty that are not provable in any conventional sense of the term. They stand as juristic truths independent from questions of empirical proof.

Fuller cautioned that a legal fiction becomes dangerous when it is believed for then the fiction can approximate a lie, but there is also danger when the force of its constitutive power is ignored. When this occurs, the label of fiction works a denial and removes from memory important lessons regarding the law and the fragility of the human experience

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"Just the Facts, Ma'am"?

Kenneth D. Chestek, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, has published "Judging by the Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story." Here is the abstract.

The recent debate about whether 'empathy' is a desirable trait in Supreme Court Justices begs a more fundamental question: are appellate court judges in fact persuaded by appeals to pathos? This article attempts to answer that question by reporting the results of an empirical study the author conducted that investigates whether narrative reasoning, or 'stories,' are persuasive to appellate judges. It is the first rigorous study to ever confront this issue directly. The article first describes how the author wrote four test briefs, two on each side of a hypothetical lawsuit. One brief on each side was written as a 'pure logic' brief, while the other brief on each side made the same logical argument but also included a great deal more context and interesting, but legally irrelevant, background details to tell a more complete story. Groups of appellate judges, law clerks, appellate court staff attorneys, practicing lawyers and law professors were then asked to read two briefs on a randomly-assigned side of the case (either Petitioner or Respondent), and then report which of the two briefs was more persuasive.

The key findings of the study were that appellate judges, along with most other groups, indeed found the 'story' briefs more persuasive. The exception was the law clerk group, which found the logic and the story briefs equally persuasive. The author then speculates as to why the clerks reacted differently, and considers the implications of this finding on law school curricula.

Download the paper from SSRN here.

Brief Writing As Story Telling

Helen A. Anderson, University of Washington School of Law, has published "Stories about Storytelling: 100 Years of Brief Writing Advice." Here is the abstract.

This essay looks at examples of brief writing advice from the early to mid-twentieth century. Although criticism of verbosity and disorganization has been a consistent part of such advice to this day, there are also important changes over time. First, the modern brief is a relatively recent invention, not an ancient legal tradition. Briefs were originally just what the name suggests: short abstracts of the legal argument to be fully developed orally. During the twentieth century the importance of briefs and oral argument reversed - now the brief is the primary means of persuasion while the oral argument presents the abstracted highlights. Second, the debate about the relative importance of reason and emotion, logos and pathos, or law and storytelling, is an old one, and likely to continue. At the beginning of the twentieth century, brief writers were told to avoid emotional or narrative appeals and present only the logical legal argument. But in the wake of legal realism a few decades later, lawyers were told to craft their arguments like artists and novelists. Today, we appear to be in a period where the importance of narrative is enjoying increased recognition once more. The wisest advisors, however, have always urged the use of both logic and narrative in an attempt to persuade.

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The Influence of Early Literary Theorists On Legal Writers

Stephen E. Smith, Santa Clara University, ha spublished "The Poetry of Persuasion: Early Literary Theory and Its Advice to Legal Writers," in volume 6 of the Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors (2009). Here is the abstract.

This article will address the possibility and necessity of aesthetic
pleasure as a part of persuasive endeavors. It will do so through a review of early literary theorists’ statements about what poetry does artistically, and how it does it. It will seek insight from these theorists by extracting from their writings those precepts that seem most useful to the legal writer. This is a selective and non-comprehensive review of the work of a variety of early theorists. It would be impossible to extract from each writer every “helpful hint” he might provide. Moreover, in assembling a variety of suggestions and commands from writers over the centuries, this article does not presume to be mining new concepts in writing practice. The ideas are not necessarily unfamiliar ones, but come from early, perhaps original sources.

The article also attempts to go from these past exhortations to some sort of present-day pertinence. How can the advice be employed in a legal writer’s practice? While the aphorisms of early theorists are invaluable, situating them in practical context may be helpful.

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How Much Do a Judge's Words Affect a Juror's Verdict?

Christopher Terranova, New York University School of Law, has published Loaded Words in the Courtroom. Here is the abstract.

A few judges recently have banned words like victim from their courtroom, concerned that the defendant will be prejudiced. However, some commentators believe that such steps are counterproductive and have no basis in empirical literature. In addition, some states, like New Jersey, continue to use the word victim in their model jury instructions for crimes in which consent is a defense (e.g., sexual assault). In this paper, I examine the existing psychology literature regarding loaded words, finding that loaded words like "victim" can bias individual jurors in some criminal cases. If judges use the word in situations in which jurors may think the judge is referring to the person allegedly injured, the jurors may be more likely to find the defendant guilty, at least before deliberation with other jurors. In addition, I describe a web experiment that I conducted to determine whether jurors were more likely to find the defendant guilty when the complaining witness was described as a victim than a complainant in the judge's closing instructions. Participants in the experiment were shown a video of a simulated sexual assault trial, which concluded with a judge reading the New Jersey model instructions mentioning the word victim about ten times (participants in the control group saw a video in which the judge used the word complainant).

Download the paper from SSRN here.